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TEACHER DISMISSALS UNDER SECTION 13447
OF THE CALIFORNIA EDUCATION CODE
California school districts today face a financial crisis more severe
than any they have encountered since the 1930's. Inflation, decreasing
state support,' and legislation such as Senate Bill 90,2 which limits the
ability of a district to increase taxes, have contributed to the worsening
fiscal condition. After twenty years of expansion, enrollment is now
declining.3 Because funding is based on average daily attendance
(ADA) figures, 4 declining enrollment has a direct impact on the fi-
nances of a school district. A decline in ADA results in a loss of
revenue5 not accompanied by a corresponding decrease in costs.6
This combination of declining enrollment, increasing expenditures,
and decreasing revenues forces school boards to reevaluate fiscal priori-
1. Since fiscal year, 1946-47, state support has declined from 58.9% to about
35%. Nelson, More Money for Schools: The Legislative Dilemma, CAL. SCHOOL
BOARDs, Feb. 1975, at 18, 19.
2. S.B. 90 is the popular name for the Property Tax Relief Act of 1972, Cal. Stat.
1972, ch. 1406 (codified in scattered sections of the Education, Revenue and Taxation,
Government, and Welfare and Institutions Codes). Under section 20905 of the Educa-
tion Code, a school board no longer sets its own tax rate. The state specifies how much
a district may spend per full-time student from both state and local sources combined;
the local tax rate then becomes whatever is necessary to meet the state-imposed revenue
limit. CAL. EDuc. CODE § 20905 (West Supp. 1976). Except for a minor inflation
factor and aid for one year only to schools with declining enrollment, the amount
available to a district remains stable even though the assessed valuation in the county
increases. See CAL. EDuc. CODE § 20905.5 (West Supp. 1976). The tax rate may be
increased only by a tax override approved by the voters.
Citizens already burdened with increased taxes, inflation, and the fear of unemploy-
ment are most reluctant to support a tax increase for the schools. Part of this reluctance
is based on a lack of understanding of S.B. 90 and on a misconception that school taxes
still rise in proportion to the increase in assessed valuation. Wentzal & Stock, SB 90:
Declining Enrollments Will Bankrupt Us, CAL. SCHOOL BOARDs, Oct. 1974, at 11, 12-13.
3. Decker, The Shrinking Schools, CAL. SCHOOL BoARDS, FEn. 1975, at 28.
4. Attendance rather than enrollment is the measure. See CAL. EDUC. CozE §§
11251-653 (West 1975) (method of computation and its application at various educa-
tional levels). An analysis of county-wide ADA statistics shows that of fifty-eight
California counties, thirty-seven have experienced an overall decline in ADA in at least
one of the past three school years. See Bureau of School Apportionments & Reports,
State Department of Education, Average Daily Attendance of the Public Schools in
California, Sept. 15, 1975, Sept. 17, 1974, Aug. 22, 1973, Sept. 12, 1972.
5. CAL. Eouc. CODE § 20905 (West Supp. 1976).
6. Wentzal & Stock, SB 90: Declining Enrollment Will Bankrupt Us, CAL.
SCHOOL BoARDs, Oct. 1974, at 11-13.
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ties in order to reduce spending. Since only about 15 percent of the
average district's budget is not directly or indirectly related to salaries
and benefits, most meaningful efforts at economy require staff reduc-
tions.7 Such reductions in the number of teachers and administrators
are governed by section 13447 of the Education Code," which "deals
primarily with teacher-school district relationships, i.e., the right of the
latter upon the advent of hard times to discharge the former."9
Under the provisions of section 13447, a district may reduce its
certificated staff 10 in reverse order of seniority when such reductions are
made necessary by a decline in ADA or a decision by the school board
to reduce or discontinue a "particular kind of service."'" Not later than
March 15 of the year preceding dismissal, the district must give notice of
the recommendation not to rehire.12 The employee is then entitled to a
hearing conducted by an administrative law judge, 13 often referred to by
the former designation, hearing officer, who subsequently prepares a
proposed decision which may or may not be accepted by the school
7. Pritchard, Assessments Up, Enrollment Down, and Still the Schools Need
Money, 6 CAL. J. 280, 281 (1975).
8. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13447 (West 1975).
9. Ferner v. Harris, 45 Cal. App. 3d 363, 369, 119 Cal. Rptr. 385, 388 (1975).
10. Certificated employees include, for example, teachers, counselors, librarians,
and administrators. See CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 12902, 12908 (West 1975). Although
this note will refer generally to the dismissal of teachers, the analysis applies equally to
other certificated employees. In reality, administrators are rarely laid off because they
usually have seniority rights which allow them to return to the classroom if their
administrative positions are eliminated.
11. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13447 (West 1975). There has been some controversy as
to when section 13447 can be applied to probationary employees. According to the
statute, "when in the opinion of the governing board. . . it shall have become necessary
.. . to decrease the number of permanent employees in said district, the said governing
board may terminate the services of not more than a corresponding percentage of the
certificated employees of said district, permanent as well as probationary .... ." Id. In
one case, the teacher argued that this provision requires the dismissal of at least one
permanent employee before any probationary employee can be terminated. See Krausen
v. Solano County Junior College Dist., 42 Cal. App. 3d 389, 116 Cal. Rptr. 833 (1974).
Such an interpretation would prevent almost all dismissals, since seniority rules usually
prohibit the dismissal of a permanent employee while any probationary teacher is
retained. The court held that under section 13447 a district could dismiss probationary
teachers without having first dismissed a permanent teacher. This decision was based on
the general rule that "when statutory language is susceptible of two constructions, one
which would produce absurd consequences and the other a reasonable and fair result, the
latter construction should be adopted." Id. at 405, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
12. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13443(a) (West 1975).
13. The two terms will be used interchangeably in this note. The change in
designation took place pursuant to an executive order of the acting director (now
director) of the Office of Administrative Hearings and was effective September 1, 1975.
See California State Department of General Services, Office of Administrative Hearings,
Operations Memo No. 175, Aug. 21, 1975.
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board." The board's final determination to dismiss must be made by
May 15.1' If the prescribed notices and the right to a hearing are not
given, the teacher is deemed reemployed for the ensuing year.-6 Em-
ployees dismissed under section 13447 retain preferential rehiring
rights.17 This provision is the sole legal authority for teacher dismissals
occasioned by the district's financial problems. 18  A lack of funds,
unaccompanied by a decline in ADA or a reduction in services, is not
good cause for dismissal.19
The simplicity of this description belies the difficulty involved in
implementing the statute, which contains a maze of ambiguous language
laden with traps for the unwary. Section 13447 incorporates the
procedure of section 13443, governing the dismissal of probationary
teachers for cause, which may involve incompetency or unfitness to
teach. 0 Section 13443 in turn incorporates some but not all of the
14. CAL. EDuc. CODE § 13443(c) (West 1975). With a few modifications
regarding notice and discovery, the procedure is conducted in accordance with Chapter 5
of the California Administrative Procedure Act. See CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 11500-28
(West 1966 & Supp. 1976).
15. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13447 (West 1975).
16. Id.
17. Id. §§ 13448-49. Permanent employees have a preferred right of reemploy-
ment for thirty-nine months after termination. Probationary employees have a similar
right for twenty-four months. If an employee is rehired, the period of absence does not
constitute a break in service, and the employee retains the classification and rank
achieved at the date of termination.
18. Section 13447 specifies that no permanent or probationary employee may be
dismissed for any reason not stated in sections enumerated therein, none of which
include financial reasons other than those stated in section 13447. Elsewhere, the code
provides that "[n]o permanent employee ...shall be dismissed ...when the district
does not have sufficient funds to pay his salary." Id. § 13313.
19. In a recent case, a school district unsuccessfully argued that a provision of the
California Constitution, which limits a district's ability to incur indebtedness in excess of
revenues, provides independent authority for the dismissal of probationary teachers.
Gassman v. Governing Bd., 56 Cal. App. 3d 162, 128 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1976), construing
CAL. CoNsT. art. XVI, § 18. Two earlier cases lend support to this theory, but the court
in Gassman held that in the absence of actual inability to meet present payroll
obligations, as opposed to anticipated budget deficits, the earlier cases provide no
authority for the dismissal of teachers on constitutional grounds. See Briney v. Santa
Ana School Dist., 131 Cal. App. 357, 363, 21 P.2d 610, 612 (1933); Martin v. Fisher,
108 Cal. App. 34, 41, 291 P.2d 276, 278-79 (1930).
20. A probationary employee may be dismissed only for cause, "but the cause shall
relate solely to the welfare of the schools and the pupils thereof and provided that cause
shall include termination of services for the reasons specified in Section 13447." CAL.
EDUC. CODE § 13443 (d) (West 1975). Probationary employees of community colleges
have a slightly different status. The first-year teacher is called a contract employee. The
governing board, after considering the evaluations of the teacher and recommendations
of the superintendent or college president, may choose not to enter into a contract for a
second year. See generally id. §§ 13345-49.
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provisions of the California Administrative Procedure Act.2 Although
the provisions are confusing, the rigid procedural requirements are
strictly enforced. As a result of mistakes in calculating ADA, in com-
puting the number and identity of employees to be dismissed, or in
complying with notice and hearing provisions, school boards found their
determinations rejected in whole or in part in 65 percent of those cases
in which hearings were conducted in 1975.22 Because of the lack of
sufficient legal precedents and the possibilities for multiple interpreta-
tions, there is often inconsistency in the decisions of the various hearing
officers and the lower courts.23 School boards are thus unable to act
with assurance that their dismissals under section 13447 will be upheld.
The following analysis of the difficulties facing school districts
attempting to implement section 13447 will focus on the intricacies of
the statute itself, recent cases relevant to section 13447 dismissals, and
the interpretation of the statute and these cases by the hearing officers.
Substantive problems to be considered include the proper calculation of
the number of dismissals permitted by decline in ADA and the correct
identification of particular kinds of services. Procedural difficulties to
be investigated concern compliance with the notice and hearing provi-
sions, determination of seniority, and selection of proper remedies.
Accompanying the examination of each substantive and procedural
problem will be suggestions for more successful implementation of
section 13447 under present law and proposals for legislative reform.
Dismissals Because of a Decline in ADA
Recognizing that declining average daily attendance translates into
decreased funding,24 and that school districts need to live within their
budgets, the legislature enacted section 13447 of the Education Code to
permit staff reductions that correspond to the decline in ADA.2 5 The
method for determining the permissible number of layoffs is somewhat
complicated. The district must first correctly calculate the ADA figures
for all the schools in the district for the first six months that school is in
session during the current year. Next it compares those figures with the
ADA for the first six months of either of the two preceding school
years,2 6 whichever will result in the larger percentage of decline.
21. See note 14 supra.
22. Panel Discussion, "A Critical Reexamination of the Nonreemployment of
Probationary Public School Teachers in California, Sections 13443 and 13447 of the
Education Code: a 1975 Update," California State Bar Convention, in Los Angeles, Sept.
25, 1975. (Paul DeLay, Deputy County Counsel for Monterey County).
23. See text accompanying notes 38-39, 138 infra.
24. See note 4 supra.
25. CAL. Eiuc. CoDE § 13447 (West 1975).
26. Id.
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Comparison would be made using 1973-74 as the base year because the
10 percent decline in ADA between that year and the current year
(1975-76) will permit more dismissals than would a comparison with
1974-75.
The correct method of applying the 10 percent reduction was set
forth in Burgess v. Board of Education.2 7  The district may reduce its
staff to the same ratio of certificated employees to ADA as existed in the
base year, here 1973-74.28 If there were, for example, 500 employees
with 10,000 ADA in 1973-74, then the number of employees needed to
maintain the ratio with 9,000 ADA is 450. The district must take into
account the fact that normal attrition may already have reduced the staff
below the 500 who were employed in 1973-74.29 If there are 470
teachers employed in 1975-76, only 20 need be dismissed to maintain
the ratio.
In Burgess, the district argued that attrition should not be consid-
ered and that the percentage of reduction in ADA should be applied to
the current year. 0 Were this interpretation followed, the district in the
example above would be able to lay off 50 teachers and to retain a ratio
of 420 teachers to 9,000 ADA. The court in Burgess pointed out that
the legislature permitted the governing board to decrease the number of
employees only when declining ADA made it necessary to do so, and
that a failure to account for attrition would result in a "reduction of force
not necessarily required by decline in average daily attendance."31
While the decision in Burgess has removed some of the ambiguities
of section 13447, school districts still use inconsistent and improper
methods to compute the number of dismissals permitted as a result of
declining ADA. A study of the decisions of administrative law judges
reveals that districts have used a variety of invalid computation methods.
For example, in the hearings of spring 1975, one district applied the
percent of reduction in ADA to its present staff rather than to that of the
base year and then subtracted for attrition;3 2 another used ADA calcula-
tions based on more than six months;33 and a third attempted to use
27. 41 Cal. App. 3d 571, 578-79, 116 Cal. Rptr. 183, 188 (1974).
28. Id. at 578, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
29. Id. at 578-79, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
30. Id. at 578, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
31. Id. at 579, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
32. Teresa Cannell, No. L-8771, at 4 (Claremont Unified School Dist., May 2,
1975).
33. Elizabeth Luevano, No. L-8735, at 4 (South Whittier School Dist., Apr. 17,
1975).
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figures based on projected ADA decline rather than the figures of the
current year. 4 The above mistakes, although not uncommon, represent
school board actions contrary to any reasonable interpretation of the
language of section 13447 or the decision in Burgess. Other mistakes
result, however, because the ambiguous language of the statute lends
itself to various interpretations.
Some Problems in Applying Section 13447 to
ADA-Related Dismissals
Projected Attrition
One troublesome aspect of the law governing ADA-related dismis-
sals is the issue of projected attrition. The question is whether a district
must take into account staff attrition occurring after the end of the first
six months of the school year. The court in Burgess appears to have
answered that question in the negative by specifically requiring consider-
ation of only those who have "departed the system in the computation
period."3 5 Logically, the same period should be used for computation
of both attrition and ADA. Attrition occurring after the end of the
sixth month would be reflected in the next year's calculations along with
further decline in ADA. Nevertheless, several hearing officers have
directed school boards to reflect by a proportionate decrease in the
number of dismissals any additional loss by attrition during the remain-
der of the school year. 6 These decisions appear to be inconsistent with
the opinion in Burgess. They are also unnecessary, since the filling of
any vacancies created by attrition after the computation period would be
governed by sections 13448-49, which provide for preferential rehiring
rights for teachers dismissed under section 13447Y.
Calculations Resulting in a Fractional Number of Dismissals
Usually the calculations for teacher dismissals for decline in ADA
result in a fractional number of teachers to be laid off. Some hearing
officers have rounded the number off to the next higher number when
the fraction was higher than one-half. This practice would allow, for
example, the termination of five teachers if the number was 4.78.38
34. Annie Patterson, No. L-8961, at 5 (Pasadena Unified School Dist., May 7,
1975).
35. 41 Cal. App. 3d 571, 579, 116 Cal. Rptr. 183, 188.
36. See, e.g., Melody A. Acker, No. L-8786, at 5 (Santa Barbara School Dist.,
May 5, 1975).
37. See note 17 supra.
38. Trudy Wohlers, No. N-6140, at 3 (Mark West Union School Dist., May 6,
1975).
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Another hearing officer has maintained that "[w]hile positions can be
fractionalized and decimalized, persons cannot be. . ." 9 The latter
view is supported by the language of the code, which provides that "the
said governing board may terminate the services of not more than a
corresponding percentage of the certificated employees of said district
. . "40 Thus, the better policy would be to drop any fraction.
Identifying the "First Six Months of the School Year"
Section 13447 specifies that ADA figures are to be calculated for
the "first six months in which school is in session." '41 Although the
period from September 1 to March 1 is normally used and has not been
questioned by the courts,42 the language of the statute would seem to
permit other interpretations. For example, the six-month period could
commence on July 1, the date which marks the beginning of both the
fiscal year and the period used for computing ADA for state funding
purposes.43 Districts conducting summer schools and those with year-
round schools would find this interpretation logical.
There are practical reasons, however, for beginning the period in
September. The greater the yearly variation in conditions in the period
used in the base and current years, the less reliable will be the statistics
used for comparing "attendance.41 Unless the district is on a year-round
schedule, the desired uniformity of conditions is more likely to occur in
the fall months than in the summer. Summer school ADA may vary
greatly from year to year, not because of a decline in population, but
because of optional attendance and yearly changes in curricular offer-
ings.
Nevertheless, there is no essential reason for the computation peri-
od beginning in September to run for six months. An amendment
shortening the time period to three months45 would make implementa-
tion of section 13447 more workable without impairing statistical validi-
ty. The decline in ADA is seen principally in the difference between
the number of students graduating and the number of those in the
entering class, rather than in any great fluctuation between October and
39. Thomas Miyoko, No. N-6055, at 5 (Mt. Pleasant School Dist., Apr. 11, 1975).
40. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13447 (West 1975).
41. Id.
42. See Burgess v. Board of Educ., 41 Cal. App. 3d 571, 575, 116 Cal. Rptr. 183,
186 (1974). The errors in calculations were not the result of using the incorrect dates.
43. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 20905 (West Supp. 1976).
44. To achieve minimum variation, consistency in all statistical data is crucial.
For example, if adult school ADA was included in the base year, it should be included
in the current year. Similar consistency should be applied to the inclusion -of teachers on
leave in the total number of certificated employees.
45. Such an amendment has been proposed. See A.B. 2284 (1975).
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March. Shortening the period to three months would alleviate some of
the time constraints to be discussed in the portion of this note which
deals with procedure.46
Determining "All of the Schools of a District"
Another problem in the interpretation of section 13447 is whether
a districfs adult schools should be counted in the ADA computations.
Although the statute specifies "all of the schools of a district,"4  adult
schools should be treated separately for section 13447 purposes. Adult
school ADA is computed differently than regular day school ADA.4
Furthermore, service in the adult school does not usually count toward
the attainment of permanent status in the day school. 9 While staff
reductions under section 13447 must be in reverse order of seniority,50 a
combined seniority list for adult and regular school personnel is thus
impossible.5 '
The practical purposes of section 13447 could be more effectively
served if instead of requiring a decline in ADA in the district as a whole
as a prerequisite to any dismissals, the statute permitted reduction in
staff at a particular level when there is a decline in ADA at that level-
preschool, elementary, secondary, or community college.52 The present
law presents problems for the unified school district (grades one
through twelve) whose ADA at one level has declined while the total
ADA in the district has remained stable. The district cannot dismiss
any elementary school teachers, nor can it transfer them if they lack the
credential required to teach at the secondary level. While the district
might wish to grant the affected teachers leave to requalify for a
secondary credential, school districts that suffer declining enrollment
rarely have the funds necessary for such projects.
Dismissals Based on the Reduction of a
Particular Kind of Service
In addition to allowing dismissals based on a decline in ADA,
section 13447 permits a school district to reduce its staff by reducing or
discontinuing a "particular kind of service. ' 53 A district cannot be sure
46. See notes 167-75 & accompanying text infra.
47. CAL. EDuc. CODE § 13447 (West 1975).
48. See id. §§ 11401, 11501.
49. Id. § 13311.
50. Id. § 13447.
51. Brief for Complainant at 10-11, Harvey Becker, No. N-6085 (Sequoia Union
High School Dist., May 7, 1975).
52. See A.B. 2284 (1975).
53, CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13447 (West 1975).
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that its reduction or discontinuance will be upheld by the administrative
law judge or the courts because neither the Education Code nor the
cases decided under section 13447 adequately define a "particular kind
of service." Furthermore, certain services are mandated by other stat-
utes and are therefore not subject to discontinuance under the authority
of section 13447. For example, a high school is required to teach
English, physical education, and a foreign language,'; to provide library
service, 5 and to offer special education for the mentally retarded.56
In the 1930's several cases construing the predecessor to section
1344717 established that although a particular subject might be re-
quired, the method of teaching could be discontinued so as to justify a
reduction in staff."8 For example, teaching of art by a traveling art
specialist could be discontinued and the subject thereafter taught by
regular classroom teachers.59 The code required that art be taught, but
it did not mandate that the subject be taught by a traveling art teacher.
During the period of growth that characterized the 1950's and
1960's, school districts were increasing services rather than discontinu-
ing them,60 but in 1974 the courts again were called upon to define a
"particular kind of service."
Burgess v. Board of Education: An Unnecessarily
Restrictive Interpretation of Section 13447
In Burgess v. Board of Education,61 a school district faced with
financial problems argued that its decision to increase class size would
result in a reduction in services that would justify the dismissal of thirty-
eight teachers. 62 The court found that the proposed action would
constitute a reduction in "teaching in general, 6 3 a term not further
defined but which may be considered to mean the activity of teaching
54. Id. § 8571(c).
55. Id. § 7050.
56. Id. § 6902.
57. Cal. Stat. 1929, ch. 23, §§ 5.710-11, at 249.
58. See, e.g., Schwalbach v. Board of Educ., 7 Cal. 2d 459, 60 P.2d 984 (1936)
(teaching of mentally retarded in separate room discontinued); Jones v. Board of
Trustees, 8 Cal. App. 2d 146, 47 P.2d 804 (1935) (teaching of music by specialist
discontinued).
59. Davis v. Berkeley School Dist., 2 Cal. 2d 770, 40 P.2d 835 (1934) (services of
associate director of kindergarten discontinued).
60. See E. Harper, Educational Management and Evaluation Commission, Califor-
nia State Department of Education, The Shrinking School District 1, May 1974.
61. 41 Cal. App. 3d 571, 116 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1974). The opinion in Burgess was
previously discussed with regard to ADA-related dismissals. See text accompanying
notes 27-31 supra.
62. 41 Cal. App. 3d at 575, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 186.
63. Id. at 579, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 189
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itself as opposed to the teaching of a particular course. "Teaching in
general," the court held, is not a particular kind of service."
This conclusion was based on the theory that the legislature intend-
ed the phrase "particular kind of service" to refer only to a service which
the district could eliminate as well as reduce."5 School Code section
5.711,66 a predecessor of section 13447, allowed dismissals when it
became "necessary to decrease the number of permanent employees in a
school district on account of the discontinuance of a particular kind of
service in such district .... ,"67 Since a 1970 amendment, 8 section
13447 has permitted dismissals for reductions as well as discontinuances
of a particular kind of service. Focusing on the repetition in the
amendment of the phrase "particular kind of service," the court in
Burgess construed the repetition in the amendment of the phrase "partic-
ular kind of service" as indicating a legislative intent to allow dismissals
upon reduction of only those kinds of services which could be discontin-
ued.69 Since "teaching in general" could not be discontinued, the
general teaching staff could not be reduced under section 13447.70
No legislative history confirms the court's interpretation of the
1970 amendment. 71 Certainly, the predecessor statute, which allowed
dismissals pursuant to a total discontinuance of a service, could have
been construed to permit dismissals following a reduction of that same
service without the necessity of an amendment. The more logical
interpretation of the 1970 amendment would be that it expands the
scope of the statute to allow dismissals pursuant to reduction of educa-
tional services that cannot be entirely eliminated.
Applications of Burgess
Reduction of Nonteaching Positions and
Code-Mandated Courses
As noted above, the reasoning in Burgess is subject to criticism.
Nevertheless, until the decision is overruled or changed by the legisla-
ture, the administrative law judges and the lower courts will continue to
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Cal. Stat. 1935, ch. 690, § 22, at 1885.
67. Id. (emphasis added). A 1967 amendment extended application of the
provision to probationary employees. Cal. Stat. 1967, ch. 1040, § 1, at 2647 (codified at
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13447 (West 1975)).
68. Cal. Stat. 1970, ch. 1565, § 3, at 3205, as amended, CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13447
(West 1975).
69. 41 Cal. App. 3d at 579, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
70. Id.
71. Karbach v. Board of Educ., 39 Cal. App. 3d 355, 361, 114 Cal. Rptr. 84, 88
(1974).
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attempt to interpret it to sustain or invalidate teacher dismissals under
section 13447. On the theory that cutbacks in staff may be justified by
reduction of only those services which may be discontinued, administra-
tive law judges have interpreted Burgess to uphold dismissals following
the reduction of optional nonteaching positions such as curriculum
assistant72 or elementary school counselor" and optional programs such
as gifted and learning disability groups74 or apprenticeship training.75
By the same reasoning, Burgess has been applied to prohibit
dismissals pursuant to a particular course which cannot be discontinued
if a district is to meet minimum statutory requirements.76 For example,
schools are required to offer courses in physical education. 77 Therefore,
according to some interpretations of Burgess, reduction of a physical
education program cannot justify dismissals. 78  Since the court in Bur-
gess did not define the term "teaching in general," it is difficult to apply
its holding to the teaching of particular subjects. The Burgess court
was faced not with a reduction in the number of sections of physical
education, but rather with a reduction in overall teaching service by
increasing the size of all classes.79 Both logic and policy dictate that
Burgess not be applied to the reduction of a specific curricular offering.
Such a reduction is distinguishable from an overall increase in the
student-teacher ratio. As long as a district does not reduce its offerings
in a code-mandated course below the level required by law, that reduc-
tion should be considered a reduction of a particular kind of service.
When decreasing revenues require that some teachers be dismissed,
school districts need the flexibility which would allow them to reduce,
for example, the number of sections of physical education in order to
retain a valuable elective in autoshop.
Reduction of Elective Courses
According to Burgess, a school district may justify dismissals by a
reduction of only those services which it could discontinue."0 Even the
72. See Patrick A. Abell, No. 8785, at 2 (Pomona Unified School Dist., Apr. 21,
1975).
73. See Lacy v. Richmond Unified School Dist., 13 Cal. 3d 469, 473, 530 P.2d
1377, 1379, 119 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3 (1975).
74. See Joy Davis, No. 8693, at 4 (Wiseburn School Dist., May 2, 1975).
75. See Krausen v. Solano County Junior College Dist., 42 Cal. App. 3d 394, 401,
116 Cal. Rptr. 833, 838 (1974).
76. See, e.g., Joy Davis, No. 8693, at 3 (Wiseburn School Dist., May 2, 1975)
(physical education program reduced).
77. CAL. Enuc. CODE §§ 8551(g), 8571(d) (West 1975).
78. See Joy Davis, No. 8693, at 3 (Wiseburn School Dist., May 2, 1975).
79. See text accompanying notes 61-64 supra.
80. See text accompanying notes 65-70 supra.
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most liberal interpretation of Burgess should therefore uphold dismissals
pursuant to the reduction of courses which are not required by the
Education Code. The distinction between elective and required
courses, however, is not always easily ascertainable. For example,
grades seven through twelve are required to offer courses in "English,
including knowledge of and appreciation for literature, language and
composition, and the skills of reading, listening, and speaking."81 The
code does not define each particular English course, but rather requires
that certain subject matter be included in the curriculum. The design of
specific courses with content which will reflect the guidelines set forth in
the code is left to the discretion of the local district. For purposes of
section 13447, any course which a district could discontinue without fal-
ling below the minimum standard established by law should be consid-
ered an elective and therefore a particular kind of service.82
A few administrative law judges have held, however, that reduction
of such electives as mass media, photography, journalism, and public
relations constitutes a reduction of "teaching in general" as defined by
Burgess and not a reduction of a particular kind of service." Such a
broad application of Burgess is unwarranted. 4 Even under the Burgess
definition, a decrease in the number of sections of an elective course is
obviously a reduction in a particular kind of service, a service which
could be eliminated. This reduction in specific course offerings is
readily distinguishable from the across-the-board increase in class size
that the school district in Burgess used to decrease expenses.8 5 An
interpretation of Burgess that precludes the reduction of an elective as a
81. CAL. EDIUC. CODE § 8571(a) (West 1975).
82. See A.B. 2284 (1975).
83. See, e.g., Janice J. Allen, No. L-8519, at 3-5, 11 (Tustin Unified School Dist.,
May 6, 1975) (creative writing, madrigals, and autoshop); Kathleen Wax, No. L-8654,
at 4 (Southern Kern Unified School Dist., Apr. 29, 1975). The administrative law judge
in the Wax case relied on the language of the Burgess trial court, which specified that
particular kinds of services must be "special, unique and unusual" programs, such as
remedial reading, head start, and foreign language aids. The judge in Wax then found
that the nursing service and the American Learning Corporation Program came within
that definition and that community laboratory classes and programs in mass media and
public relations did not. This decision ignores the fact that the court of appeal in
Burgess did not consider the trial court's examples and limited its definition of a
particular kind of service to a program or position that the district could discontinue. See
text accompanying notes 65-70 supra.
84. Nor is it supported by the 1930's cases decided under the predecessor of
section 13447. Typically, the courts have held that the dismissal of a teacher was
authorized when the district decided to discontinue a course in machine shop. See, e.g.,
Schumacher v. Taft Union High School Dist., 25 Cal. App. 2d 732, 78 P.2d 471 (1938).
85. Any increase in class size that resulted from the former would be merely
incidental to the reduction in service, as it would be if the district decided not to replace
retiring teachers. In Burgess, however, the district argued that the mere increase in class
size was the reduction in service. 41 Cal. App. 3d at 575, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 186.
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particular kind of service renders the reduction in services provision of
section 13447 practically useless. Most districts experiencing financial
problems have already eliminated the special programs and services"'
that would be allowed under this broad application of Burgess, and
would therefore be prevented from making any staff reductions based
on cutbacks in curriculum.8 7
Determining the Extent to Which a Particular
Service May Be Reduced
According to section 13447:
[Whenever ADA has declined] or whenever a particular kind of
service is to be reduced or discontinued . . . and when in the
opinion of the governing board . . . it shall have become neces-
sary by reason of either of such conditions to decrease the num-
ber of . . . employees in the district, the said governing board may
terminate the services of not more than a corresponding percentage
of the certificated employees of said district.88
Before a dismissal for declining enrollment may be initiated, there must
have been a decline in ADA, and the number of dismissals must
correspond to the percentage of decline.8 9 There is, however, no
comparable condition precedent governing a board's decision to reduce
or discontinue a particular service. Once the board has determined that
the service is "particular" within the meaning of section 13447, the
decision to reduce the service and the extent of reduction are within its
discretion.9"
86. See text accompanying notes 72-75 supra.
87. One could also argue broadly that since "administration in general" is a service
which a district may not discontinue, the elimination of the position of curriculum
assistant would not justify a reduction in staff under section 13447 and the decision in
Burgess. Such an argument would probably not be accepted by any administrative law
judge, but it is no more illogical than the argument used to invalidate dismissals based on
the reduction of elective courses.
88. CAL. EDuc. CODE § 13447 (West 1975) (emphasis added).
89. See text accompanying notes 26-29 supra.
90. See Krausen v. Solano County Junior College Dist., 42 Cal. App. 3d 394, 406,
116 Cal. Rptr. 833, 841 (1974). The economic benefits resulting from this broad
discretionary power over the number of dismissals will be limited if the teachers
dismissed for reduction in services must be counted as attrition when ADA calculations
are made the following year. See text accompanying notes 26-29 supra. The number of
ADA-related dismissals would then be reduced by the number of reduction in services
dismissals that have taken place since the year with which the district compares the
present year's ADA figures. The district would be free to institute further reductions in
services, but eventually all nonessential services will have been discontinued. The statute
provides two separate grounds for dismissal, and each should act independently in order
to be effective. Attrition should be limited to departures resulting from resignation,
retirement, or dismissal for cause.
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Section 13447 specifies that the number of dismissals must corre-
spond to the amount by which the board has decided to reduce the
service. 9  Although the statute applies -the term "corresponding percent-
age" to both types of dismissals, the court in Krausen v. Solano County
Junior College District92 held that in all practicality the percentage
language could be said to apply only to ADA-related dismissals.93 In
Krausen the teacher argued that section 13447 limited the amount of
staff reduction to a percentage corresponding to the percentage by
which the attendance in the particular program had declined. 94  The
court agreed with the school district that because the amount by which a
service is reduced is discretionary, there is no way of calculating a
corresponding percentage. The district's discontinuance of the teacher's
position in the apprenticeship training program was a valid reduction of
a particular service, and the dismissal pursuant thereto was upheld.95
In reduction in services cases there is no corresponding percentage
because the initial determination of the amount by which the service is
to be reduced is in fact a determination of the number of positions that
will be eliminated.9 6 The board does not announce a reduction of a
certain amount and then determine how many employees will be affect-
ed. It merely decides that a certain number of employees rendering
particular kinds of services must be laid off.97 Thus the phrase "corre-
sponding percentage" is inappropriate for dismissals based on reduction
in services.
Procedure
Summary of the Procedure and the Problems
Section 13447 governs the dismissal of both permanent and proba-
tionary teachers for reasons of decline in ADA or reduction of particular
91. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13447 (West 1975).
92. 42 Cal. App. 3d 394, 116 Cal. Rptr. 833 (1974).
93. Id. at 405-06, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 841.
94. Id. at 405-06, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 840-41. This argument, if accepted, would
have made any dismissals under the reduction in services provision dependent on a
decline in ADA.
95. Id. at 406, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 841.
96. See, e.g., Neal Abello, No. 8763, at 3 (Santa Barbara High School Dist., May
5, 1975) (list of designated services to be eliminated with the number of certificated
positions involved).
97. There are, however, limitations on a board's discretion to reduce particular
kinds of services. Early cases decided under the predecessors to section 13447, sections
5.710 and 5.711 of the School Code, established that a board must act in good faith and
not resort to a reduction in services as a subterfuge to rid itself of an unwanted teacher.
"[The law] will not . . . permit the dismissal of that employee for the sole purpose of
employing another whose qualifications may seem more desirable." Chambers v. Board
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services. 9 After a school board has determined, pursuant to section
13447, that a certain number of employees are to be laid off, the board
must carefully follow the procedures of section 13443 and those sections
of the California Administrative Procedure Act incorporated therein.99
Section 13443 is, in addition, the statute under which probationary
teachers are dismissed for cause.100 Thus the procedure in those cases
and in section 13447 dismissals is the same.
The dismissal procedure is initiated by service of a preliminary
notice prior to March 15.101 This notice informs the employee of the
reasons for the decision recommending dismissal 02 and of the right to a
hearing to determine whether there is cause for termination.10 3  If the
teacher requests a hearing, certain Government Code provisions be-
come relevant.0 4 The district is required to serve the teacher with an
accusation, which essentially repeats the reason for dismissal that was
incorporated in the March 15 notice. 10 5 The respondent teacher may
file a notice of defense and request discovery. 0 6  At the hearing,
conducted by an administrative law judge,10 7 the teacher may be repre-
sented by counsel'08 and has the right to cross-examine witnesses.10 9
Strict rules of evidence need not be followed." 0
of Trustees, 38 Cal. App. 2d 561, 566, 101 P.2d 727, 729 (1940). See also Fuller v.
Berkeley School Dist., 2 Cal. 2d 152, 161, 40 P.2d 831, 834 (1935) (per curiam opinion
denying rehearing). See note 57 supra. No recent cases decided under section 13447
have involved this issue, but several dismissals for cause have been invalidated when the
true cause of dismissal was not the teacher's classroom performance but rather his
exercise of constitutional rights. See, e.g., Bekiaris v. Board of Educ., 6 Cal. 3d 575,
592-93, 493 P.2d 480, 490-91, 100 Cal. Rptr. 16, 26-27 (1972). This protection would
apply equally to teachers being dismissed pursuant to the reduction of a particular
service.
98. See note 11 supra.
99. See note 14 supra.
100. See note 20 supra.
101. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13443(a) (West 1975).
102. Id.
103. Id. § 13443(b).
104. See note 14 supra.
105. CAL. GOVT CODE § 11503 (West 1966). The fact that a school board must
accuse teachers of declining enrollment is evidence of the inappropriateness of section
13443 procedures to section 13447 dismissals.
106. CAL. Enuc. CODE § 13443(c) (West 1975). This subsection modifies various
provisions of the Government Code. For example, a notice of defense must be filed
within five rather than fifteen days, and discovery must be requested within fifteen rather
than thirty days after service of the accusation. Compare CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 11506,
11507.6 (West 1966 & Supp. 1976) with CAL. EDuc. CODE § 13443(c)(1)(2) (West
1975).
107. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 11502, 11512 (West Supp. 1976). See also note 13
supra.
108. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11505 (West Supp. 1976).
109. Id. § 11513(b).
110. Id. § 11513(c).
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The teacher may challenge the accuracy of the district's ADA
calculations' or its definition of a particular kind of service," 2 the
place assigned him or her on the seniority list,113 or the sufficiency of the
March 15 notice.1 1 4 In addition, the teacher may present evidence that
the board's action was arbitrary and capricious, or that the real motiva-
tion was not a decline in ADA or a reduction in services, but official
dissatisfaction with the employee's exercise of constitutional rights." 5 In
contrast, the board's discretion to set budget priorities and to reduce one
particular service and not another is not subject to challenge." 6
After hearing all the evidence, the administrative law judge renders
a proposed decision, which must be transmitted to the board by May
7.1" The board then has three choices: to adopt the decision; to refer
the case to the administrative law judge for the taking of additional
evidence; or to reject the decision and make its own determination on
the basis of the whole record, including the transcript of the hearing."' s
In any case, the board has the final authority and must make its decision
and notify the teacher of dismissal before May 15."1'
The following section of this note will examine difficulties in
complying with the notice and hearing provisions of the Education and
Government Codes, offer practical suggestions for meeting present re-
quirements, and propose legislation to facilitate the implementation of
section 13447. The difficulties stem from the complexity of the rules;
the interplay and inconsistency among section 13447, section 13443,
and the relevant sections of the Government Code; and the uncertain
111. See text accompanying notes 32-34 supra.
112. See note 83 & accompanying text supra.
113. See text accompanying notes 141-43 infra.
114. See text accompanying notes 123-33 infra.
115. See, e.g., Bekiaris v. Board of Educ., 6 Cal. 3d 575, 493 P.2d 480, 100 Cal.
Rptr. 16 (1972) (dismissal for cause but governed by same procedure as § 13447
dismissals).
116. Coan, Legal Gamesmanship, ADMiN. L. BULL., July-Dec. 1971, at 1, 4.
117. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13443(c) (West 1975). When, as in the case of the May
7 deadline, no remedy is provided for failure to satisfy a statutory requirement, the
command is said to be directory only, and an act in violation thereof is not an automatic
nullity. Deadlines accompanied by sanctions, however, are considered jurisdictional, and
no action subsequent to such a date is valid. This general principle of statutory
interpretation has been frequently enunciated. See, e.g., Siegal v. Superior Ct., 68 Cal.
2d 97, 102-03, 436 P.2d 311, 314-15, 65 Cal. Rptr. 311, 314-15 (1968); Whitley v.
Superior Ct., 18 Cal. 2d 75, 79, 113 P.2d 449, 452 (1941); Shaw v. Randall, 15 Cal. 384,
387 (1860); Karbach v. Board of Educ., 39 Cal. App. 3d 355, 363-64, 114 Cal.
Rptr. 84, 89 (1974), quoting Ward v. Fremont Unified School Dist., 276 Cal. App. 2d
313, 322, 80 Cal. Rptr. 815, 821 (1969); Thomas v. Driscoll, 42 Cal. App. 2d 23, 27,
108 P.2d 43, 45 (1940).
118. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11517(b)-(c) (West Supp. 1976).
119. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13447 (West 1975).
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applicability of recent cases. Common procedural mistakes include
failure to state sufficiently in the March 15 notice the reason for
dismissal; incorrect determination of seniority; and omission of findings
of fact by a board which rejects the proposed decision of the administra-
tive law judge. Also at issue is the question of remedy-whether a
teacher unlawfully dismissed is entitled to reinstatement, or whether, in
some cases, the court can remand the case and allow the board to correct
its procedural errors.
The rules governing the implementation of section 13447 are
rigidly enforced, placing local school boards "at the peril of being
perfect in the procedural handling of dismissal hearings of probationary
teachers, regardless of the soundness of the reasons for dismissal."' 20
When a teacher's means of livelihood is being taken away, perhaps a
board should be held to perfection.' Unfortunately, the lack of clear-
cut guidelines under present laws makes perfection difficult to achieve.
The March 15 Notice
A March 15 notice is not valid unless it is timely, explicit as to the
reason for dismissal, and served on the proper party based on the
seniority principle enunciated in section 13447.
In Karbach v. Board of Education,2 2 -the court held that after the
March 15 deadline, a school board is powerless to dismiss teachers for
any reason not specified in the preliminary notice. In Karbach, the
district advised forty-three teachers that because of a 6 percent decline
in ADA, it would be necessary to recommend termination of their
services. After the hearing had begun, the board realized that a drop of
approximately 6 percent would entitle it to lay off only thirteen teach-
ers."' With the permission of the hearing officer, the board amended
its pleadings to add a second reason for dismissal, namely reduction in
services. The court held that the teachers were entitled to rely on the
reason given in the March 15 notice, and that any amendment after
March 15 was invalid. 24  The purpose of requiring early notification is
120. Feist v. Rowe, 3 Cal. App. 3d 404, 410, 83 Cal. Rptr. 465, 468 (1970).
121. See Karbach v. Board of Educ., 39 Cal. App. 3d 355, 363, 114 Cal. Rptr. 84,
89 (1974).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 359, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 86.
124. Id. at 363, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 89. The opinion in Karbach found no inconsis-
tency with section 11507 of the Government Code, which permits amendment of the
accusation. The court stated, "The Administrative Procedure Act relates to the hearing
stage which is 'initiated by filing an accusation.' . . . Section 13447 . . . insofar as it
adopts the requirement of a notice of recommendation, states a condition precedent to
any hearing being called for." Id. at 363, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 89. Furthermore, if there
were any inconsistency, the particular provisions of the Education Code would prevail
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to enable the teacher to assess the probability of final termination in
May and, if necessary, to seek a position elsewhere during the time when
districts are interviewing prospective candidates.125  Those dismissed
teachers in Karbach who were high on the seniority list reasonably
concluded that they would not be laid off on the basis of a 6 percent
decline in ADA and therefore had no reason to seek other employ-
ment.' 26  The court allowed only the thirteen dismissals which were
justified by the decline in ADA because only the thirteen teachers
involved had received proper notice of dismissal which was not affected
by the district's attempt to amend.127 The case was remanded to the
school board to determine which thirteen teachers were lowest in senior-
ity and therefore subject to dismissal. 12 8 All other teachers were to be
reinstated, since the board had lacked the power to terminate them.'2 9
One superior court has used the ruling in Karbach, combined with
the seniority provisions of section 13447,130 to permit a domino effect,
invalidating dismissals even though the correct reason for the layoff was
given before March 15. In Teachers Local 1163 v. Board of
Trustees,'' the district sent ADA notices to the twenty-one teachers
with the least seniority and reduction in services notices to the next
twenty-six teachers on the seniority list. The district had miscalculated,
and only eleven ADA notices should have been sent. After the March
15 deadline, the district attempted to convert the ten invalid ADA
notices into reduction in services notices. According to Karbach, how-
ever, the district had no power to dismiss for any reason not stated in the
March 15 notice. Therefore, the superior court ordered the ten teachers
reinstated. In addition, the teachers who could otherwise have been
dismissed because of reduction in services were reinstated because they
had seniority over the ten recipients of the invalid ADA notices. 13 2
According to section 13447, the district was obligated to terminate in
the inverse order of employment, and it could not dismiss any teacher
who was credentialed and competent to perform the service of any less
senior teacher being retained. 133
over the more general provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. Id.; CAL. CODE
Civ. PRoc. § 1859 (West 1955).
125. 39 Cal. App. 3d at 362, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 88.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 364, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 90.
128. Id. at 365, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 90.
129. Id. at 363, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 89.
130. For further discussion of seniority, see notes 140-57 & accompanying text
infra.
131. Teachers Local 1163 v. Board of Trustees, Civil No. 193982 (San Mateo
County, Cal. Super. Ct., Aug. 22, 1975).
132. See Harvey Becker, No. N-6085, at 10 (Sequoia Union High School Dist.,
May 7, 1975).
133. Id. A similar result would have been possible if the district had sent reduction
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If the district had sent its reduction in services notices to the
teachers with the least seniority, the domino theory would not have
applied. Only the ten teachers receiving the invalid ADA notices would
have been reinstated. Those receiving reduction in services notices
could not have claimed seniority as a basis for reinstatement. Thus,
according to this court's approach, whether ten notices or thirty are
invalidated depends on whether the notices sent to the least senior
employees are upheld. As was argued by the school district in Teachers
Local 1163,
[The situation] places an intolerable burden upon school districts.
School district administrators must somehow be able to accurately
predict the exact number of teachers to be terminated for either
A.D.A. or reduction of services prior to any discovery, hearing,
testimony, or evidence, all designed to elicit facts about those very
issues. Such a rule would effectively nullify the hearing procedure,
since once a single erroneous notice is discovered, all remaining
dismissals involving more senior teachers are invalidated.13 4
School districts should now be aware that the domino theory of the
Teachers Local 1163 decision might be applied to them. The district
that sends ADA notices to those with the least seniority would probably
have fewer dismissals invalidated because the standard for calculating
ADA is clearer than that for determining the definition of a particular
kind of service. While there is some dispute as to the fine points of
ADA calculation,"' the basic mathematical formula is well-known. In
contrast, the question of what particular courses may be reduced or
eliminated in light of the Burgess decision is far from resolved. 38
Moreover, it is possible to argue that if dismissals based on reduction in
services are processed first, the teachers thus dismissed should be count-
ed as attrition in the ADA calculations, with the result that fewer
dismissals under ADA would be permitted. The decision in Teachers
Local 1163 points out the need to amend section 13447 to provide that
one or more invalid dismissals cannot be used to invalidate others.1 37
Meanwhile, some districts are attempting to avoid invalidation of
dismissals by including both reasons for dismissal-decline in ADA and
reduction in services-in each March 15 notice. 38  No court of appeal
in services notices to those with the lowest seniority and then discovered, after March 15,
that one of the services it sought to discontinue was mandated by the code. In that case,
the teacher having the most seniority among those who had received notices would have
been reinstated because he or she had been sent an invalid notice. In addition, those
who had received otherwise valid ADA notices, would have been reinstated because they
could not have been dismissed while someone with less seniority was retained.
134. Brief for Complainant at 7, Harvey Becker, No. N-6085 (Sequoia Union High
School Dist., May 7, 1975).
135. See text accompanying notes 35-40 supra.
136. See text accompanying notes 76-87 supra.
137. Such a provision was included in A.B. 2284 (1975).
138. In Santa Clara County, one judge upheld a dual notice and another found a
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has ruled on the sufficiency of such a notice. A notice merely restating
all the statutory provisions that permit dismissal would not satisfy the
purpose of the notice requirement because it would not enable the
teacher to assess by March 15 the probability of termination on May
15.119 On the other hand, a notice which specified the percent by
which ADA had declined, enumerated the particular services to be
reduced or discontinued, and gave each teacher his or her number on the
seniority list would allow the teacher to evaluate the possibility of
termination even though the notice did not specify which reason for
dismissal applied to which teacher.
Determination of Seniority
An attempted dismissal may also be subject to challenge if, because
of a mistake on the seniority list, the district sends notice to a teacher
who is certificated and competent to render the service performed by an
employee of less seniority who is being retained. Subject to questions
of certification and competency, the general rule is, "Last hired, first
fired."14  Other seniority issues that may be raised at the hearing
include determination of whether a teacher is probationary or tempo-
rary,'' identification of the date on which paid service was first ren-
dered,142 and calculation of the seniority of part-time employees.''
similar notice invalid. Teachers Local 2393 v. Governing Bd., No. 331741 (Santa Clara
County, Cal. Super. Ct., Aug. 25, 1975) (notice invalid); Campbell Elementary Teach-
ers Ass'n. v. Abbott, No. 332523 (Santa Clara County, Cal. Super. Ct., Aug. 21, 1975)
(notice valid).
139. See text accompanying notes 124-26 supra.
140. An entire seniority system may be challenged when it conflicts with a district's
affirmative action policy. This conflict has not yet been completely resolved by the
courts, and the subject is not within the scope of this note. In a recent opinion,
Attorney General Evelle J. Younger reviewed the applicable federal and state law and
appellate decisions which have articulated the basic proposition that "a seniority system
that is neutral on its fact will be upheld as 'bona fide' even though layoffs under such a
system will have a disproportionate impact on minority workers . . . unless such a
system supports present employment practices which perpetuate the effects of past
discrimination." 59 OP. CAL. ATT'Y GEN. 73, 77 (1976). He concluded that a school
district which is laying off teachers under the authority of section 13447 may not give
women and minorities special preference over more senior employees unless one of these
more junior employees has a "competency," such as bilingualism, which is needed by the
district and not possesed by any of the more senior employees. Id. at 74.
An assembly bill was introduced in 1975 to permit districts to make exceptions in
the order of termination to meet the requirements of an affirmative action program. A.B.
2284 (1975).
141. See, e.g., Elizabeth Smrekar, No. N-6112, at 10 (Cambrian School Dist., May
1, 1975). See also Balen v. Peralta Junior College Dist., 11 Cal. 3d 821, 523 P.2d 629,
114 Cal. Rptr. 589 (1974).
142. See, e.g., Sharon Ahler, No. L-8534, at 3-4 (Palos Verdes Unified School Dist.,
May 6, 1975).
143. See, e.g., Teresa Cannell, No. L-8771, at 3 (Claremont Unified School Dist.,
May 2, 1975).
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Place on the seniority list is determined by the first date on which
paid service was rendered.144 If several employees share the same first
date, their respective ranks will be determined by a lottery which must
be conducted within thirty days of employment. 14 5 Since all permanent
and probationary certificated employees must be listed,146 the district
should not omit administrators or teachers on leave. If substitute or
probationary teachers are placed on the list, they must be distinguished
because they are not subject to the provisions of section 13447.17 It is
to the district's advantage to keep and publicize a current seniority list.
Those districts which fail to hold lotteries until dismissals are imminent
miss the opportunity to settle seniority disputes before March 15 notices
are sent. When the district discovers at the hearing that mistakes in the
seniority lists have resulted in sending notices to the wrong teachers, it is
too late to correct the errors.148
According to the seniority principle, senior employees have bump-
ing rights over those more recently hired. 49  If, for example, a district
144. CAL. EDuc. CODE §§ 13263, 13447 (West 1975). An example of the extreme
importance of that date is found in the hearing of Sharon Barnard, No. 4412 (Cambrian
School Dist., May 2, 1974). As the hearing officer noted: "A further inquiry was made
as to whether said respondent Barnard should have been given a date of first paid
services as of September 5, 1973-the date in which the District held a teacher orienta-
tion meeting which was optional to attend and for which attending teachers were paid.
This respondent did not attend such meeting although she was aware of the same. She
was not informed, at that time, that her attendance could affect her seniority. However
regretable such may be, it is herewith found that said respondent. . . is presumed to
know the law." Id. at 4.
145. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13263 (West 1975). The thirty-day requirement is
directory only; thus, failure to observe the deadline does not invalidate otherwise correct
dismissals effectuated after that date. See Annie Patterson, No. L-8961, at 6 (Pasadena
Unified School Dist., May 7, 1975). See note 117 supra.
146. See CAL. Euc. CODE 08 13263-64 (West 1975).
147. "Substitute and temporary teachers . . fill the short range needs of a school
district, and may be summarily released absent an infringement of constitutional or
contractual rights." Balen v. Peralta Junior College Dist., 11 Cal. 3d 821, 826, 523 P.2d
629, 632, 114 Cal. Rptr. 589, 592 (1974). The advantage of having the names of
substitute teachers on the seniority list is that when such a teacher achieves permanent
status, his or her rank among others with the same date of paid service will already have
been determined. See CAL. EDuc. CODE §§ 13336-36.5 (West 1975 & Supp. 1976).
148. See text accompanying notes 122-31 supra.
149. Section 13447 provides that "the services of no permanent employee may be
terminated . . . while any probationary employee, or any other employee with less
seniority, is retained to render a service which said permanent employee is certificated
and competent to render." CAL. EDuc. CODE § 13447 (West 1975). This provision
omits seniority rights for probationary employees. The last paragraph of the section
directs school boards to "make assignments and reassignments in such a manner that
employees shall be retained to render any service which their seniority and qualifications
entitle them to render." Id. It has been recognized that the last paragraph of section
13447, the language of which is not restricted to permanent employees, confers seniority
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decides to discontinue the service performed by a veteran administrator,
he or she is not fired, but returns to the classroom, bumping the teacher
with the lowest seniority. 150 There is, however, one limitation on the
seniority rule. The veteran administrator may be dismissed if he or she is
not credentialed or competent to perform the service rendered by any
more junior employee. 151 Similarly, an employee who is credentialed to
be a nurse but not to teach in the classroom does not have seniority rights
over a classroom teacher. 15 2 By the same token, a teacher in a bilingual
migrant education program whose position is being retained but whose
junior status would ordinarily result in dismissal because of decline in
ADA will maintain the position if there is no more senior employee who
is credentialed and competent to perform the service. 53
Problems arise when the more senior employee has a valid creden-
tial but is not thought competent to teach the course in question. In
Krausen v. Solano Junior College District,' a teacher whose position in
a Navy apprenticeship program had been eliminated had a credential
which would have entitled him to the position held by a physics teacher
with less seniority. Krausen had majored in chemistry and engineering,
with minors in mathematics and physics; he had, however, no recent
training in the physical sciences and no experience in astronomy, which
was required for the physics course.' 55 The board determined that he
was incompetent to teach the course because he lacked experience,
recent training, and a master's degree. 56 The appellate court upheld
the board's decision. 157
rights on both permanent and probationary employees. See Krausen v. Solano County
Junior College Dist., 42 Cal. App. 3d 394, 405, 116 Cal. Rptr. 833, 838 (1974). Without
attempting to reconcile the apparently contradictory language of the provision omitting
seniority rights for probationary employees with the provision directing the school board
to Consider the seniority of all employees, the court merely found in the latter provision
a clear mandate to the districts to grant seniority rights to probationary employees.
150. See, e.g., Lacy v. Richmond Unified School Dist., 13 Cal. 3d 469, 472, 530
P.2d 1377, 1379, 119 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3 (1975).
151. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13447 (West 1975).
152. Elizabeth Smrekar, No. N-6112, at 8, 10 (Cambrian School Dist., May 1,
1975).
153. Diane E. Helgoth, No. N-6076, at 2 (La Honda-Pescadero Unified School
Dist., Apr. 14, 1975).
154. 42 Cal. App. 3d 394, 116 Cal. Rptr. 833 (1974).
155. Id. at 404, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 839-40.
156. Id. In such a dismissal the board has the burden of proving incompetency,
which it may discharge merely by examining the academic background of the teacher.
The teacher, however, may bring forth evidence of competency to refute the charge. See
Davis v. Gray, 29 Cal. App. 2d 403, 408, 84 P.2d 534, 538-39 (1938). For a general
discussion of incompetency see Rosenberger & Plimpton, Teacher Incompetence and the
Courts, 4 J.L. & Eouc. 469 (1975).
157. 42 Cal. App. 3d at 404, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
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School districts must make curriculum changes to meet the needs
of a rapidly changing technology. As a result, good teachers with many
years of service may be terminated because their programs are being
phased out. To protect such teachers, the districts might consider
granting one-year educational leaves without pay so that the teachers
could prepare themselves to take on new duties. This action would
postpone but not eliminate the needed staff reduction. After the educa-
tional leave, the teacher could exercise seniority rights over the appropri-
ate teacher with less seniority. In many instances, a teacher may be
competent to take on duties in a new field but may simply lack the
necessary credential. Legislation providing for a provisional credential
in such cases would be appropriate.
Posthearing Procedure
After the administrative law judge has heard all the evidence, he is
to render a proposed decision containing findings of fact together with
"a determination as to the sufficiency of the cause [for dismissal] and a
recommendation as to disposition."'158 If the board accepts the pro-
posed decision, it may send final May 15 termination notices without
independently reviewing the transcript.159 If it rejects the decision,
however, the board must decide the case on the record, including the
transcript, and must make its own findings of fact. 60
Employee's Right To Receive a Copy of the
Proposed Decision
The right of a dismissed employee to receive a copy of the pro-
posed decision of the hearing officer by May 7 is provided by section
13443(c) of the Education Code. 6' The effect of a district's failure to
comply is uncertain. In Compton v. Board of Trustees'6 2 the court held
that the failure to provide a copy of the proposed decision could not be
used by teachers to delay indefinitely the starting of the statute of
limitations for filing writs of mandate. In dicta the court denied the
very existence of the right in cases in which the board has rejected the
proposed decision and made an independent judgment.' 6 3 The court's
conclusion was based, however, on its construction of section 11517 of
158. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13443(c) (West 1975).
159. Greer v. Board of Educ., 47 Cal. App. 3d 98, 111, 121 Cal. Rptr. 542, 550
(1975).
160. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 11517(c), 11518 (West 1966 & Supp. 1976). Lucas v.
Board of Educ., 13 Cal. 3d 674, 532 P.2d 110, 119 Cal. Rptr. 462 (1975).
161. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13443(c) (West 1975).
162. 49 Cal. App. 3d 150, 122 Cal. Rptr. 493 (1975).
163. See id. at 157-58, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 498.
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the Government Code, which, at the time of the events in question, was
the sole source of the right to receive the proposed decision.6 If there
is any inconsistency between the two code sections, the more specific
provisions of the Education Code should prevail, insuring the right to
receive a copy of the proposed decision in all cases. 165 Nevertheless, a
district's failure to satisfy the requirement of section 13443(c) would
probably not nullify an otherwise valid dismissal.' 6
Time Constraints
When a board decides to reject the hearing officer's decision and to
render an independent judgment on the record, it often faces insurmount-
able time constraints. The board cannot commence dismissal procedures
much before March 15 because of the reyquirement that ADA be com-
puted over a period of six months in order to determine the number of
employees to be dismissed. 67  The end of the sixth month falls within
the first two weeks of March. The Office of Administrative Hearings is
deluged with requests for hearings during the period between March 15
and May 15.168 Consequently, the board may not receive the hearing
officer's proposed decision until nearly May 15. Frequently there is not
time to obtain and analyze a copy of the transcript before the deadline.
A board wishing to reject the proposed decision and call for the
transcript may not continue the time for decision past the May 15
164. See id. Language specifically directing service of the proposed decision in
cases in which the board rejects the proposal of the hearing officer had been deleted
from subdivision (c) of section 11517 of the Government Code. The court, in dicta,
concluded that the remaining general language applies only to cases in which the
proposed decision has been adopted by the board or is remanded to the hearing officer
for further taking of evidence. Id. The court cited case law to the effect that a decision
need not be served until it is adopted, but in these cases the decision was adopted by the
board and the issue was the timing and not the existence of the right. See id. To
further justify its conclusion, the court took the position that the rejected proposal could
serve no identifiable purpose in the adjudicative process except perhaps to suggest "an
approach which did not occur to [the teachers'] attorney." Id. at 157, 122 Cal. Rptr.
at 498. But cf. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 493 (1951). The
United States Supreme Court found that the federal Administrative Procedure Act's
definition of "record as a whole," including all decisions, encompasses the findings of a
hearing examiner that are rejected by the National Labor Relations Board. Although
the decision is not binding on the California courts, there seems to be no reason to take
a contrary view.
165. See CAL. CODE CiV. PROC. § 1859 (West 1975).
166. See note 117 supra.
167. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13447 (West 1975).
168. In the months of February, March, and April 1975, there were 159 cases filed
involving the dismissal of probationary teachers. Interview with George R. Coan,
Administrative Law Judge, in San Francisco, Sept. 8, 1975.
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deadline.1"' In Rutherford v. Board of Trustees,'7" the court admitted
that "[it is difficult to reconcile . . ." the notice provisions of the
Education Code with the provision of the Administrative Code permit-
ting the board to review the transcript independently, recognizing that
"[t]he board must deal with a timetable that is nearly impossible to
meet if it is to delay issuing a decision contrary to that of the hearing
officer . . . until it has had occasion to examine the transcript
. . "171 Nevertheless, the court found that the legislature intended
the May 15 notice to be mandatory172 and that employees not given
notice by that date must be reinstatedY.7 3
Legislative reform could alleviate the situation in which a govern-
ing board like that in Rutherford, although failing to meet statutory time
constraints, "cannot be said to have unnecessarily prolonged its con-
sideration of the employment issue before it.' 74 In addition to shorten-
ing the period for ADA computation,175 the legislature should amend
section 13443 to provide that as long as the decision of the administra-
tive law judge is made before May 15, a governing board will have no
less than five days after receiving the decision to call for the transcript
and may continue the proceedings for a period not to exceed fourteen
days after receipt of the transcript.
The Question of Remedy
When a district dismisses employees under section 13447 for de-
cline in ADA or reduction in services, it must use the notice and hearing
procedures found in section 13443.176 Section 13443, in addition to
providing procedures for section 13447 dismissals, governs dismissals of
probationary teachers for reasons not stated in section 13447, such as
incompetency. These latter types of proceedings are called dismissals
for cause.177  Although dismissals for cause under section 13443 and
dismissals under 13447 use the same procedure, each statute provides its
own sanctions for failure to follow the required steps.
169. Stewart v. Board of Trustees, 37 Cal. App. 3d 345, 112 Cal. Rptr. 272 (1974)
(dismissal for cause); Rutherford v. Board of Trustees, 37 Cal. App. 3d 775, 112 Cal.
Rptr. 560 (1974). After a hearing has been requested, a continuance may be granted,
but only by the administrative law judge and for good cause shown. CAL. EDUC. CODE §
13443(i) (West 1975); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11524 (West Supp. 1976). Once his
decision has been rendered, however, the administrative law judge no longer has
jurisdiction to grant such a continuance.
170. 37 Cal. App. 3d 775, 780, 112 Cal. Rptr. 560, 563 (1974).
171. Id. at 779, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 563.
172. Id. at 780, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 563.
173. See id. at 781, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 564.
174. Id. at 779, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 563.
175. See text accompanying notes 45-46 supra.
176. CAL. EDuC. CODE § 13447 (West 1975).
177. See id. § 13443(d).
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Under seotion 13443, if the board fails to give notice of nonreten-
tion by May 15, "the employee shall be deemed reemployed for the
ensuing school year."'178  Section 13447 provides the remedy of rein-
statement if -the "employee is not given the [March 15 and May 15]
notices and a right to a hearing as provided for in Section 13443."' 79
Regarding both dismissals for cause and dismissals pursuant to section
13447, the presence of a statutory remedy for failure to comply with
certain procedural requirements is the key to reinstatement. Deadlines
accompanied by sanctions for failure to meet them are considered
jurisdictional; the board is powerless to act after the deadlines.180  As
the California Supreme Court has explained, "[Wihere a consequence
is attached to a failure to comply ... the consequence can be avoided
only by compliance with the statute.""':'
Two cases in which section 13447 provided the remedy of rein-
statement were Rutherford v. Board of Trustees'8 2 and Karbach v.
Board of Education.'83  Reinstatement was granted in Rutherford be-
cause the employees, who had been dismissed because of a decline in
ADA, had not received final notice of termination by May 15.184 In
Karbach the March 15 preliminary notice was at issue. Before March
15 the board had notified certain teachers that they would be dismissed
because of a decline in ADA. The district then discovered that the
actual decline in ADA did not justify the number of dismissals contem-
plated, and it attempted to change the reason for dismissal after the
March 15 deadline. The court held that because the original communi-
cation lacked a valid reason for dismissal by which the teachers could
assess the probability of their nonretention, it did not constitute the
statutorily required notice.8 5 The court held further that since section
13447 provided the remedy of reinstatement for failure to meet the
178. Id. § 13443(h).
179. Id. § 13447. The additional protection given teachers being dismissed for
reasons not bearing on their competency is intentional. One court has noted that
"[ejarly notification is more significant in relation to reductions in the number of
employees of a school district than it is in the case of individual dismissal for cause.
Greater competition for alternate jobs is logically to be expected and the pendency of the
proceedings is no impediment to obtaining them, as might be the case of a dismissal for
cause." Karbach v. Board of Educ., 39 Cal. App. 3d 355, 362, 114 Cal. Rptr. 84, 88
(1974).
180. See note 117 supra.
181. Whitley v. Superior Ct., 18 Cal. 2d 75, 79, 113 P.2d 449, 452 (1941), quoting
Thomas v. Driscoll, 42 Cal. App. 2d 23, 27, 108 P.2d 43, 45 (1940); Shaw v. Randall,
15 Cal. 384, 387 (1860).
182. 37 Cal. App. 3d 775, 112 Cal. Rptr. 560 (1974). See notes 169-73 &
accompanying text supra.
183. 39 Cal. App. 3d 355, 114 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1974). See notes 122-27 &
accompanying text supra.
184. 37 Cal. App. 3d at 780, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 563.
185. 39 Cal. App. 3d at 363, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 89.
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March 15 deadline, the board lacked power to act after that date.8 8
Thus each teacher who had not received by March 15 a notice contain-
ing a valid reason for dismissal was reinstated.
The California Supreme Court applied a different remedy in Lucas
v. Board of Education,187 a dismissal for cause under section 13443. In
that case, the board had failed to make findings of fact when it over-
ruled the proposed decision of the hearing officer and made its inde-
pendent decision on the transcript. 188 The court held that the teacher
had not been legally terminated by May 15.189 Unlike the errors in
Rutherford and Karbach, however, the defect in Lucas involved neither
the timeliness nor the content of -the notice itself. Furthermore, no
remedy for failure to make finaings of fact is provided in section
13443. The court held, therefore, that the procedural defect did not
deprive the board of jurisdiction to act after May 15.190 Because
the notice in Lucas had been timely, the court was not obligated to grant
the statutory remedy of reinstatement. Instead, the board was given the
opportunity to conduct a new hearing to be followed by findings of fact
and a new decision.' 9 '
In Lucas the teacher had relied on Ward v. Fremont Unified
School District,9 2 another case in which the procedural defect did not
appear on the face of the notice. The court in Ward held that the
district's failure to allow the teacher to cross-examine witnesses nullified
an otherwise valid May 15 notice.'93 Ward, however, was decided
under a provision of section 13443 as amended in 1965194 which
prohibited a district from dismissing a teacher unless all the procedural
requirements had been met. In other words, reinstatement was the
remedy for any procedural defect. That provision was omitted by a
1969 amendment, although the remedy of reinstatement for failure to
give a May 15 notice remained. 195
The court in Lucas recognized that because of the 1969 amend-
186. Id.
187. 13 Cal. 3d 674, 532 P.2d 110, 119 Cal. Rptr. 462 (1975).
188. If the board rejects the decision of the hearing officer, it may decide the case
itself upon the record, including the transcript from the hearing. CAL. Gov'T CoDna §
11517(c) (West Supp. 1976). The decision must be in writing and contain findings of
fact. Id. § 11518 (West 1966).
189. 13 Cal. 3d at 678, 532 P.2d at 113, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 465.
190. Id. at 681-82, 532 P.2d at 116, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 468.
191. Id.
192. 276 Cal. App. 2d 313, 80 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1969).
193. Id. at 322-23, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 821-22.
194. Cal. Stat. 1965, ch. 1110, § 2, at 2755, as amended, CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13443
(West 1975); see 276 Cal. App. 2d at 322, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 821.
195. Cal. Stat. 1969, ch. 1315, § 1, at 2651, as amended, CAL. EDuc. CODE § 13443
(West 1975),
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ment to section 13443, procedural defects not on the face of the notice
no longer vitiated the board's power to act when the May 15 notice was
timely. The court disapproved the degree to which appellate courts had
relied on Ward for the proposition that the May 15 deadline is jurisdic-
tional.196 This statement should not be interpreted to mean that a
deadline ceases to be jurisdictional in cases such as Rutherford or
Karbach in which, unlike the error in Lucas, the defect is one to which a
statutory remedy applies.
The appellate courts have not yet applied Lucas to a section 13447
dismissal. Lucas should be strictly limited to cases in which the proce-
dural error is not covered by a statutory remedy. Section 13447
provides for reinstatement not only for failure to send timely notices, but
also for failure to give the "right to a hearing as provided for in Section
13443 . . . ."I" Thus, reinstatement should be granted if the district
fails to provide a hearing. The question is whether reinstatement would
be the remedy if a hearing was granted but contained procedural
defects. For example, a hearing in which the teacher was not allowed
counsel would not be a hearing as provided for by section 13443. If the
statute is construed to require a procedurally correct hearing, then such
defect would result in reinstatement. Under this analysis, the results
reached in Lucas would apply to a section 13447 dismissal only if the
defect was neither in the March 15 or May 15 notice nor in the hearing
procedure.
Conclusion
The foregoing discussion has set forth many of the problems facing
school districts attempting to implement section 13447. These prob-
lems are the result of a poorly drafted statute and a lack of well-
reasoned judicial interpretation. Instead of providing a clear and work-
able standard for dismissals, the statute has given rise, through its
ambiguities, to a procedural quagmire which has in turn resulted in
lengthy and costly adjudications. 19  Districts are held to strict compli-
ance with the statute, and slight errors in procedure invalidate dismis-
196. 13 Cal. 3d 674, 682, 532 P.2d 110, 116, 119 Cal. Rptr. 462, 468 (1975).
197. CAL. EDUc. CODE § 13447 (West 1975).
198. The current hourly rates for administrative law judges and reporters are $44
and $23, respectively. An administrative law judge spends an average of nine hours on
each hearing. Letter from George R. Coan, Administrative Law Judge to author, Feb.
13, 1976. Additional expenditures include the cost of the time of administrators who
testify on behalf of the district and the salaries of substitute teachers who must be hired
to replace the teachers who are absent to attend hearings. In a recent dismissal hearing
the cost to the taxpayers of substitutes for forty-seven teachers in hearings for two days
was $3,000. Spangler, Solutions to Teacher Dismissals?, The Country Almanac, Aug.
20, 1975, at 2, col. 1.
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sals. Yet because of the possibilities for multiple interpretation and the
lack of clear legal precedents, districts cannot be sure what standard will
be accepted by a particular administrative law judge or superior court
judge to determine compliance.
Although teachers frequently benefit from the invalidation of at-
tempted dismissals, they are also victimized by the uncertainty that
accompanies the implementation of section 13447. When the district
prevails, deleterious side effects of time and money lost and emotional
strain on faculty, administration, and the board often outweigh the
financial saving resulting from the reduction in staff.
As more and more districts experience the effects of declining
enrollments, inflation, and losses in revenue, utilization of section 13447
will increase. Thus, prompt legislative and judicial action to clarify the
law pertaining to staff reductions is imperative.
Nancy Ozsogomonyan*
* Member, Second Year Class.
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